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Abstract
Enforcing copyright laws aimed at intellectual property protection of electronic design is generally con-
sidered a hard task. The difficulty is in discovering infringements effectively and proving them as such in a
court of law. While reverse engineering is a widely used and legal tool to extract schematics from fabricated
integrated circuits, determining that a given circuitry is trivially derived from a patented technique or method is
very hard, often impossible, in a reasonable amount of time. Furthermore, forensic analysis of fabricated chips
is usually so complex that its application to large collections of commercial products is usually prohibitive. Wa-
termarking is one of several techniques available today to deter copyright infringement in electronic systems.
The technique consists of implanting indelible stamps in the circuit’s inner structure, while not disrupting its
functionality or significantly degrading its performance. In this paper a series of methods is proposed for the
creation of watermarks at several stages of the design cycle, from high-level design to layout. Algorithms are
described for implanting robust watermarks to minimize the overhead and, ultimately, to reduce the impact on
performance. Detection methods have also been discussed in the presence of infringement. The resilience of
the methods in several tampering regimes has been estimated.
1 Introduction
With the introduction of large-scale system-on-chip (SOC) design paradigms, the VLSI semiconductor industry
is undergoing a revolution. As a consequence, a significant increase in operating speeds and design productivity
is expected. Circuit components will be available to integrators in electronic form rather than in silicon. Such
components, known as virtual components, will be delivered for a particular application according to a specific
contract. Due to the new medium of storage and exchange, virtual components are prone to infringements and
abuses, i.e. uses beyond the original contracts and/or by unauthorized integrators. Protecting the Intellectual
Property (IP) rights of the authors of virtual component is an emerging multi-disciplinary field encompassing
several aspects of today’s IC design process.
Existing legal devices, such as patents, trade secrets, copyrights, and non-disclosure agreements are aimed
at deterring potential infringement. However, the real Achille’s heal of the system is currently the enforcement
of such rights. The goal of IP protection as a whole is to provide necessary technologies to make enforce-
ment a more manageable task while deterring infringement at all levels of a design. A possible such scheme
requires the capability of effectively detecting and subsequently tracking IP infringement cases. This task can
be accomplished by a process known as watermarking. The method consists of embedding a unique code, or
watermark, which exploits the IP’s unique features. Fundamental requirements for a watermark are that it be
(1) transparent, i.e. not interfering with the design functionality, (2) robust, i.e. hard to remove or forge, (3)
detectable, i.e. easy to extract from the design. The process used for managing watermarks must not necessarily
be proprietary, while the code used in the encryption process should be secret for any released IP.
There exist three basic types of virtual component, based on its characterization through (a) behavioral
description (soft IP), (b) structural description (firm IP), and (c) physical description (hard IP). Hard IPs are
generally released as a plug-and-play component for one or more technologies, while firm and soft IPs are par-
tially implemented versions of a design, thus a number of degrees of freedom are still available to the integrator
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landscape of IPs, their protection is also a complex task.
Recently, watermarking has been proposed to protect digital audio-visual IPs. The literature is very exten-
sive on the subject. Here we mention only two works [1, 2] because they allow us to introduce some of the
techniques used in this paper. The main method described in [1, 2], though with small variations, essentially
consist of superimposing a pseudo-random noise to the signal of the record. Such noise, though completely
inaudible, can be easily detected via digital signal processing methods.
Schemes based on watermarking have been recently proposed for electronic IPs as well. In [3, 4] the
watermark assumes the form of a extraneous bit stream, hidden inside large Field Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGAs). The watermark is stored in some of the unused configurable control logic blocks of the FPGA. Each
unused lookup table is responsible for storing a single bit in the code. All the configurable control elements
used in the watermark are then routed in the design for mimetic purposes. This is done in such a manner to
avoid any impact on the original functionality. The method has later been refined in [5] where the signature is
modified before being embedded so as to mimic the statistical properties of the existing design, hence reducing
detectability. One issue in our opinion still remaining in this approach is the fact that to date watermarked
lookup tables do not reflect any functionality, thus representing a potential weak point in the scheme.
In [6, 7] it was proposed to incorporate several watermarks, distributed over all the abstraction levels of a
given design. The techniques differ depending on the abstraction level they are applicable to. At the physical
design level, the watermark assumes the form of a set of topological constraints governing the relative position,
orientation, and, possibly, scaling of the devices or gates of the circuit. At structural and RTL level, constraints
on the structure of a selected set of nets are used to represent the watermark. Watermarks are created at multiple
levels of hierarchy simultaneously. This is provably a very robust and flexible techniques since it requires the
elimination of watermarks placed at every level of abstraction. Erasing one level, by resynthesizing a logic
circuitry for example, may erase the watermarks created at that abstraction level and, possibly, at lower levels,
while leaving higher abstraction levels (and their watermarks) intact. As expected, this is the a particularly
costly and complex scheme. Another advantage of this scheme is the fact that forgery can be traced and a
history of tampering actions can be derived.
Several authors have proposed to use other design constraints to implant watermarks. In [8] fixed placement
and delay constraints implemented the watermark. In [9] a sequence of nodes in a multi-level logic function
was permuted according to a seeded pseudo-random selection scheme. In [10, 11] schemes have been proposed
to implant watermarks in regular sequential functions by modifying the original function in a structured fashion.
In [8], the authors proposed two methods for embedding signatures in a design. The first method, general in
nature, can be applied to several abstraction levels. It consists of adding clauses to a satisfiability problem. For
convenience, the authors restricted themselves to a subset of the problem known as (3SAT), where each clause
added to the original problem codes a sequence of symbols or a section of the signature to be embedded. IF a
design can be represented in terms of a 3SAT formulation, then it will be possible to embed an arbitrary signature
in it. The second method is applicable to firm and hard IPs only, as it consists of formulating the signature
in terms of a set of delay sub-constraints which are found in delay constrained signal paths. Constraints on
floorplanning block relative locations are also used to embed a signature.
In the case more than one party is involved in creation of an IP, any of the above techniques does not
guarantee that the infringements can be tracked. Watermarking should be performed simultaneously at various
levels of abstraction [6]. The goal is to improve the robustness of the approach and to allow quick and accurate
tracking of the last licensee, who ultimately caused the infringement. In this paper we will describe a consistent
strategy for incorporating watermarks in an electronic circuit at all abstraction levels, i.e. in all phases of a
design flow.
At least two types of watermarking schemes exist. The first scheme, known as active watermarking, con-
sists of integrating the watermark as a part of the design process, thus allowing the creation of an arbitrarily
high number of uniquely watermarked designs. In the second scheme, known as passive watermarking or
fingerprinting, one creates a unique and compact representation of a design at any abstraction level. This repre-
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the signature from an existing design and comparing it with the original one. To avoid false claims, a third
party organization should maintain a database of all registered signatures for which protection is sought [12].
Both approaches are robust, since the deletion of the watermark results, with high probability, in the removal of
wanted functionality.
IP protection based on watermarking consists of two phases: synthesis and detection. The synthesis phase
is fully characterized by (a) a set of algorithms translating design features onto a unique watermark, and (b) Pu,
the odds that an unintended watermark is detected in a design. The detection phase is fully characterized by (c)
Pm, the probability of a miss and (d) Pf = Pu, the probability of a false alarm. The set of algorithms proposed
in this paper are all classifiable based on the above criteria.
In order for any protection scheme to be effective it is necessary to define how design flows must be mod-
ified, if at all. Moreover, to allow effective infringement detection, a well-defined detection protocol must be
set up. A well-known example of such protocol is the one used by law enforcement organizations to identify
criminals based on natural fingerprints and, more recently, DNA samples found on the scene. In the case of
IP infringements, all existing prevention and detection methods are generally used simultaneously to ensure
maximal impact.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes methods to implant a watermark at the highest level
of abstraction, i.e. at the Hardware Description Language (HDL) levels. Section 3 outlines the creation of a
watermark at an intermediate level, i.e. at a structural level. Section 4 describes watermarking techniques at
the lowest levels of abstraction, i.e. at the physical implementation of the circuit. A number of examples are
presented in Section 5.
2 HDL Level Watermarking
Most HDL representations contain one or more sequential functions. In its most general form, a sequential
function is a function that transforms input sequences into output sequences. Regular sequential functions are
functions such that at any stage the output symbol depends only on the sequence of input symbols which have
been already received. Any regular sequential function operating on finite input/output sets can be specified by
means of a Finite State Machine (FSM).
A FSM is a discrete dynamical system translating sequences of input vectors into sequences of output
vectors and it is generally represented by State Transition Graphs (STGs) and State Transition Tables (STTs).
A STG is a graph whose nodes represent the states of the FSM and whose edges determine the input/output
conditions for a state to state transition. By convention, an edge is labeled by the input/output pair causing the
transition.
In real-world sequential designs, although not explicitly specified using STGs and STTs, FSMs appear in
different forms. For example, case statements in VHDL and Verilog HDL are represented as FSMs using a STG
or STT by HDL compilers. FSMs also appear in embedded software, especially to define the device drivers and
interface protocols. In large sequential designs, usually several such small FSMs exist which can be used to
watermark the entire design. By watermarking all or a selected subset of these FSMs, tampering resilience can
be reached while ensuring the method’s feasibility.
The essence of this technique is to find an unused input/output symbol sequence and use it as the watermark.
This task can be performed by using the STG representation of the regular sequential function. By visiting every
state and finding the unused input/output symbol pairs, one can determine the candidate subset of such symbol
pairs at each state in the FSM.
After calculating the required input/output symbol sequence length which satisfies given uniqueness con-
straints, i.e. constraints on Pu, one can generate a sequence by selecting enough input/output symbol pairs.
If the found input/output symbol pairs are not sufficient, then one can create extra ones by augmenting the
input and/or output alphabets. The estimation of Pu and the derivation of the length of the input/output symbol
4Figure 1: An example of two possible ways of watermarking a FSM: a) original FSM; b) adding transitions; c)
augmenting input and adding transitions
sequence can be found in [13].
Finally, by connecting the states, one can generate a trace in the FSM. Some selections of input/output
symbol sequences and the states may generate large FSMs.
To capture the essence of the proposed techniques, consider the example of Figure 1. The original FSM
is depicted in Figure 1(a) in terms of its STG. The FSM has two input bits and one output bit. Assume one
has decided that a watermark of length 2 is satisfactory and suppose the proposed watermark is represented by
input/output sequence ((00,1)(11,0)). Figure 1(b) illustrates the new FSM obtained after augmentation and state
selection.
Assume that the input/output pairs available are not satisfactory. Then, in this case, the number of inputs
is first incremented by one (for illustrative purposes). Two extra transition relations can hence be added. The
resulting FSM is depicted in Figure 1(c).
In the remainder of the paper we will restrict ourselves to deterministic FSMs, using the same notation of
[14] and [15].
Definition 1 Let a FSM be a tuple M = (Σ,!, Q, q0, δ,λ), where Σ and ! are respectively the input and
output alphabets, Q is a finite set of states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, δ(q, a) : Q × Σ → Q⋃{φ} is the
transition relation, and λ(q, a) : Q× Σ→ Q⋃{$} is the output relation.
5q ∈ Q, a ∈ Σ, b ∈ ! refer to a state, an input and an output, respectively. φ denotes an unspecified next state
while $ is an unspecified output. A FSM can be identified by the mapping of all its input and output sequences,
or IO mapping.
Definition 2 An IOmapping is defined to be the sequence of input/output pairs ((a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . , (ak, bk)) ∈
(Σ × (!⋃{$}))k specifying the output sequence of the FSM for a given input sequence.
Let us define Σ∗ and !∗ as the sets of all strings in Σ and in !, respectively. Let s = (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ Σ∗ be
an arbitrary input sequence and let d = (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ !∗ be an output sequence. Moreover, define λ(q, s) to
be the output symbol of the FSM and δ(q, s) its state when s has been applied in state q. String s is said to be
contained in M iff a state reached by applying s to state q0 is still in M , i.e. iff δ(q0, s) ∈ Q.
Completely specified FSMs (CSFSMs) contain every element of set Σ∗, i.e. every input sequence in Σ∗
results in a unique output sequence in!∗. An incompletely specified FSM (ISFSM) is one in which there exist
some transition relations with unspecified destination and/or output, i.e. there exist a set of input sequences for
which no output is specified. Call Iu ⊂ Σ∗ such set. Conversely, there exist a set of output sequences which
can be produced only by unspecified input sequences. Call Ou ⊂ !∗ such set. The problem of minimizing the
number of states in CSFSMs can be solved in polynomial time [16]. For ISFSMs the problem is known to be
NP-complete [17]. Algorithms for reducing such machines are proposed in [14, 15, 16].
Let M ′ = (Σ′,!′, Q′, q′0, δ′,λ′) be an ISFSM and PM ′ be the set of all possible completely specified
implementations of M′. Thus, for each p ∈ PM ′ , every element of Iu and Ou is eventually associated to an
element of !∗ and Σ∗, respectively. Let us select an arbitrary sequence sσ ⊂ Iu and the corresponding output
sequence dσ ∈ !∗. Let tuple σ = {sσ, dσ}, call it IO signature.
Consider first an active watermarking regime. The problem of synthesizing a watermark for an ISFSM M′
is equivalent to that of finding a minimum sized machine M′′, whose specified IO mapping has been augmented
by an IO signature σ on specification of M′. It is also required that robustness constraint specified as Pm and
Pu. be satisfied. The problem is formulated as following
Problem 1 Minimize size ofM′′, s.t.
Pm ≤ Pm , Pu ≤ Pu , (1)
where Pm and Pu are constraints on the watermark robustness. Note that the size is measured in terms of added
states and logic.
Problem 1 can be partitioned into two tasks. The first task consists of computing the size of IO signature
σ so as to satisfy the constraints on the confidence. The second task is that of finding the actual IO signature
so as to minimize the overhead of M′′. The IO signature must be generated with some degree of randomness
to ensure that, using the same algorithm one cannot generate an identical code. The randomized algorithm is
controlled by key k. The key k is provided by the user to control the generation of the IO signature and of the
sequence of states activated by the it. k is used to select from n best state sequences and IO signatures. In this
case, the minimality of the overhead might not be guaranteed.
In case keeping the IO signature secret were not possible, then one of the following approaches could be
used. The authentication of the generated IO signature can be achieved by registering the key of a specific
design in a third party database, similarly as in copyright and trademark registration.
An alternative solution is that of explicitly creating an IO signature based on the method proposed in [11].
The user specifies a string which is converted into a number by standard one-way hash function like MD5.
In this manner, one can guarantee that there will be no two identical IO signatures generated by two different
strings and it is computationally intractable to obtain the string from the IO signature. Using this signature, one
can find a state sequence that minimizes the overhead, even though an absolute minimum can not be guaranteed.
Synthesizing watermarks in CSFSMs requires first that the machine be translated onto a ISFSM. This can be
accomplished by extending the input and/or output alphabets Σ and!. The resulting machine is then handled by
solving Problem 1. Hence, the procedure can be seen as a preprocessing step to a general watermark synthesis
step.
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the machine itself. The process consists of first minimizing the FSM using, for example, the techniques pro-
posed in [14], thus synthesizing a CSFSM. Then, a subset of all the sections of the non-specified IO mapping
are designated as a IO signature. Randomization of the signature, controlled by key k, used to select unspeci-
fied IO sequences. Hence, the probability of accidentally synthesizing the same watermark are bounded by the
degrees of freedom of the algorithm and/or by its level of randomization.
At least two approaches exist to the generation of IO signature σ. The first involves the generation of new
transition relations in the FSM’s STG or STT, while the second calls for the augmentation of Σ, ! or Q. All
these modifications are likely to but do not necessarily increase the size of the machine.
Let q′ ∈ Q′ denote a state in an ISFSM M′ and let q′0 be its reset state. Let I(q
′)
u be the set of all the input
configurations in q′ for which no next state is specified, call such configurations free. Define U′ to be the set
of all the states with incompletely specified transition relations, i.e. U′ = {q′ ∈ Q′ | |I(q′)u | > 0}. The total
number of free input configurations n is bounded as follows
n ≤ nmax =
∑
q′∈Q′
|I(q′)u |. (2)
Every state q′ ∈ U ′ must necessarily be reachable |I(q′)u | times, using each time one of the remaining free input
configurations in I(q′)u . Suppose that a sequence x exists of all the visited states, call s the input sequence which
forces x. The resulting output sequence d, of length n, will be one of [2|$|]n possible implementations. Hence,
the odds that an identical sequence be produced by M is
Pu =
1[
2|$|
]n − 1 . (3)
The second term of the denominator is given by the fact that one of such sequence will result from the given
input sequence in the CSFSM in PM ′ . By setting Pu ≤ Pu and solving (3) with respect to n one obtains
n ≥ nmin = 1|!| log2
∣∣∣∣1 + 1Pu
∣∣∣∣ . (4)
In some cases it is not possible to satisfy both (2) and (4) to meet specification (1), i.e. nmin > nmax. Hence,
either (1) must be relaxed and/or nmax must be increased.
Suppose constraints (2) and (4) are satisfied, then an output sequence dσ ∈ !∗ and the states which can
produce it must be selected. The required output is generated by an n-long sequence of states in U′. The
sequence can be seen as a path pσ = (q′0, u′1, . . . , u′n−1) covering a subset of the states in U′, with or without
repetition. It is assumed, but it is not necessary, that q′0 ∈ U ′. If this were not the case, a different first state, say
q′′0 ∈ U ′, could be selected for pσ and input sequence sσ would need to be augmented by an input sequence s
such that δ′(q0, s) = q′′0 . The generation of pσ does not contribute to the probability of coincidence Pu, but it
does determine the impact state minimization will have on the final machine. The second factor impacting the
effectiveness of the optimization is the selection of input sequence sσ.
For a given output sequence dσ, input sequence sσ is generated in two steps: selection of pσ and derivation
of sσ. Sequence pσ represents a path through n of the states in U′ from the original STG. Every time a state u′ is
touched by the path, it looses one of its |I(u′)u | free input configurations. We propose to use an algorithm based
on the Euler path search which can be targeted to minimize the number of visited states and/or to maximize the
number of remaining free configurations per state.
As an illustration, consider the ISFSM example given earlier. For each state assume there exist three out of
four free input configurations. Assume that n = 2, then two possible paths pσ are shown in Figure 2 (a) and
(b). In the example of Figure 2 (a) the number of inputs was unchanged, while in 2 (b) it was incremented by
one. Consider the example of Figure 2 (a). Path pσ, represented in bold, is selected by maximizing the number
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Figure 2: Two possible paths pσ for a given U ′: a) path based on minimum visited states criterion; b) path based
on maximum remaining free configurations
Figure 3: Decision tree to compute sσ
of remaining free configurations per state. Note that the path may begin in a state other than the reset state q0.
In this case, one must additionally find the input sequence leading to pσ’s initial state.
Once pσ for Figure 2 (a) has been selected, input sequence sσ is derived from a path on a decision tree
rooted in q0 and whose leaves correspond to state u′n−1. The solid bold line in Figure 3 represents pσ, while
the dotted line shows the path needed to reach pσ’s initial state. At each level i exactly |I(u
′
i)
u | < |Σ| branches
exist. Each branch represents the decision of using a certain free input configuration at a given state. There
exists Πni=1|I(u
′
i)
u | possible paths connecting the root state q0 to u′n−1. One or more of these paths is associated
with the smallest CSFSM M ≡ M ′. The problem of finding such path is NP-complete since in best case
the machine associated with one path must be synthesized, which in itself is an NP-complete problem. As
an illustration, if the path represented in bold in Figure 3 is used for ISFSM M′, the resulting IO signature is
{sσ, dσ} = {(1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0); (0, 0, 1)}.
Several alternatives are proposed for the generation of the input sequence sσ to minimize overhead. The first
method consists of performing an exhaustive search of the decision tree. For each path a CSFSM is synthesized
and the smallest machine is selected. The second method is a Monte Carlo approach, in which a set of input
sequences are selected at random from all the feasible ones. The CSFSMs corresponding to such sequences are
generated and the smallest one is selected. The third method is based on a branch-and-bound search. At each
level of the tree an estimate is computed for the machine associated with each sub-tree underlying any decision.
Such estimate is computed using a Monte Carlo approach. All the sub-trees with higher estimates are pruned,
while the surviving trees are explored into the next level, i.e. the next state of pσ. The search stops at the leaves.
The complete algorithm for active watermarking in FSMs is described as follows:
1. if the FSM is CSFSM then augment Σ
2. compute the minimum size of sσ, nmin, from Pu
3. if nmin > nmax then augment Σ or!
4. using k, randomly generate new output sequence dσ ∈ !∗
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Figure 4: Detection of signature under some tampering
5. compute path pσ
6. compute input sequence sσ
As a byproduct of Step 6 the FSM is synthesized. A passive watermarking scheme is applied to ISFSMs only.
The method assumes that randomization can be introduced by the FSM synthesis. It consists of converting
the original ISFSM onto a CSFSM using a given optimization criterion. Then, an IO signature is selected at
random from all the possible ones available. The only way to synthesize a CSFSM from the original ISFSM
which contains an identical IO signature is to use the same synthesis engine with an identical set of parameters
and optimization criteria. Hence, Pu can be derived in this case as the inverse of all possible machines which
can be generated from an ISFSM of a certain size and structure with the given engine.
Detecting a signature σ entails applying input sequence sσ to the machine and observing the output sequence
d. See Figure 4. If no tampering has occurred, then necessarily d = dσ and Pm = 0, i.e. no misses are possible.
To properly analyze the effects of tampering, let us consider the following scenarios:
1. specifications on the IO mapping of the original machine are known,
2. IO mapping of the original machine is not known but the STG of the modified machine is known,
3. no STG is known.
In case (1), infringement cannot be prevented, since the aggressor can resynthesize the FSM from specifications
using techniques proposed, e.g. in [15].
In case (2) the aggressor may either: (a) modify state transition relations, i.e. changing the output or next
state associated with a transition relation, or (b) apply the techniques proposed in this paper to watermark
CSFSMs. In both cases, part or the totality of the watermark will be unchanged, but it may be corrupted locally.
Tampering (a) may in fact result in a change in the functionality of the machine, it is therefore counterproductive.
Tampering (b) will only result in literal swaps and deletions within pairs of reset states, similar to gene deletion
within DNA sequences.
To combat tampering (2)b, we propose an approach based on the concept of genome search. Such approach
was successfully used in topological watermarking [6, 7]. The method is essentially a selective pattern match-
ing. It is assumed for simplicity that the output dσ is a chain of sequences all rooted in a single reset state q0.
This restriction is however not necessary as multiple reset states can be used. Suppose the IO signature is
pσ = (q0, q2, q1, q0, q3, q4, q0, q1, q2, q0)
{sσ, dσ} = { (01, 01, 00, 10, 01, 00, 11, 10, 01); (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) } .
Suppose that tampering has removed or corrupted the median section of dσ , i.e. (0, 1, 0), then the sections of
the IO signature which are still intact can be matched to σ using the genome_search algorithm described
in detail in [6]. The algorithm returns an estimate of the probability that the design contains in fact watermark
σ. Note that by construction, it is known when the reset state is reached. Hence, the boundary symbols or
operons of each “gene” are known. Also note that if this or any other error correction algorithm is used, then
our estimation of Pu is un upperbound on the true value, i.e. it is an optimistic estimate. It this case changes to
the way Pu is estimated should be applied based on the details of the algorithm. An alternative method is that
of using correction schemes such as CRC to detect and correct corrupted subsequences.
Finally, consider case (3), let us analyze the possible attempts to remove the watermark using netlist ma-
nipulations. Obviously, it is not possible to foresee all possible tampering techniques. Instead, we will analyze
those that are more likely to be performed under following assumptions.
9Assumption 1 A netlist or a structural HDL description is available for tampering.
Assumption 2 All input and output pins are well documented and extra I/O pins (if any) used for watermarking
are introduced as extra test pins and/or signal pins.
In [11] it has been proven that generating a STG from a given netlist is an NP-Complete problem. For
medium and large scale FSMs, it is unlikely that the STG can be obtained from its netlist. Therefore, if the
netlist is obtained by reverse engineering, the aggressor has no other options but to perform one of the following
modifications to remove or hide the watermark: (a) embed the FSM into a bigger one, (b) delete some of the
circuitry related to the test inputs, (c) Add dummy I/O bits and/or shuffle the bit order using unknown mapping
functions.
In scenario (a), the aggressor tries to hide the watermark under a wrap to mask the original IP from in-
put/output probing. The watermark is still intact but it may not be easily observable, if at all possible. In this
case, the detection technique proposed earlier cannot be exploited. However, simulation or on-chip measure-
ments can be used to logically insulate the original IP from the wrap.
In scenario (b), by knowing that the watermark should be related to the extra test pins, the aggressor might
try ro remove the registers and circuitry related to those inputs. In this case. the attempt would damage the
original behavior because the IO signature is an integral part of the FSM. Therefore, this attempt shall not be
successful.
In scenario (c), the aggressor adds new dummy input and/or output bits and dummy circuitry to the FSM.
In this case IP forensic can use the following exhaustive method. Let us assume that there were n input bits and
m output bits in the original watermarked FSM. Moreover assume that dn and dm extra bits have been added.
Then, one needs to apply the input sequence to each possible subset of n bits of the n + dn inputs. The output
is observed to reconstruct the correct sequence. Although it is time consuming, it is guaranteed that the IO
mapping can be found exactly, since the watermark is intact.
3 Structural or Netlist Watermarks
In the following two sections it is useful to introduce a mathematical formalism which helps describing the
watermarking algorithms being used. Let Σ∗ be the set of all strings in a finite alphabet Σ, e.g. Σ = {0, 1}.
Assume there exists a compact representation or signature for a given design at some abstraction level. Let
s ∈ S be one of all possible physical implementations of the design, let σs be its signature. Define signature
mapping S → Σ∗ : M as the mapping of a subset of all the layout features onto a signature σs = M(s). Let
us define S → S : F as a mapping which transforms implementation s onto a new implementation s′ = F(s).
The structural level of abstraction is an intermediate representation of a circuit. Generally, after a compi-
lation phase behavioral representations can be converted into a physical implementation by constructing the
symbolic connectivity map of all the necessary electrical devices. Such map is usually represented in terms of
a schematic or a netlist.
For instance, a schematic or netlist can be represented through a graph G(N,E). The nodes of the graph
correspond to general blocks, or single devices, as well as nets. The (directed) edges define connectivity. Let us
define H as the set of all blocks in Ω. Let N be the set of all nets, with E = H∪N . Let On be the set of edges
in net n ∈ N which are connected to an output. The set of edges leading to an input is called In, while the set
of edges connected to a high-impedance pin or pass transistor gate is called Pn. For simplicity, we assume that
exactly one edge can be connected to an output, i.e. |On| = 1, this condition is however not necessary. The
pin number |n| and the type and port of the gates connected by n are necessary but not sufficient properties to
uniquely identify the net. A set of constraints on sets On, In and Pn for each net, can be imposed so as to make
these properties define the net uniquely, to all practical purposes.
Consider the gate-level circuit in Figure 5(a) and the corresponding connectivity graph of Figure 5(b). Let
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Figure 5: (a) Gate-level circuit; (b) Connectivity graph
N ′ ⊆ N = {n ∈ N : |n| is prime}. Next, impose the following constraints on each net n′ ∈ N ′:
O(n′) = {gates of type ωO(|n′|)};
I(n′) = {gates of type ωI(|n′|)}; |I(n′)| = 'I(|n′|);
P(n′) = {gates of type ωP(|n′|)}; |P(n′)| = 'P(|n′|),
(5)
where ωO(),ωI(),ωP (), 'I() and 'P() are net size-dependent parameters, generated using, for example, a
parametrized pseudorandom sequence determined by key k.
It is trivial to infer that an arbitrary signature can be implanted in the structure of the netlist. Such signature
can be at the hart of the watermark, which, in this case, is known as a structural watermark. In the case of
Figure 5, Equations (5), written compactly, form the signature for net C as: σC(C) = (latch; a, d, c, 3;−, 0).
4 Watermarking Physical Implementations
Let us describe the particular mapping used in this paper to generate design signatures from given physical
implementationof a circuit. The same technique can be used to implant an arbitrary signature in terms of an
extraneous active or inactive circuit. Let us assume that the granularity of the original circuit is given. As
a result, the set of fundamental components, such as transistors or standard cells, is determined. Call such
components atomic blocks and Ω their set. In s, every component ω ∈ Ω may have multiple instantiations.
A layout implementation defines a set of all relative positions and orientations of every component instantia-
tion in the circuit. Interconnect can be represented in a similar fashion where components are replaced by pins,
Steiner points, and bends. A composition, containing the details of all relative positions and orientations, is
called topology. Let us now use the layout’s atomic blocks, pins, Steiner points, and interconnect bends, which
are in turn represented by a set of primitives called bubbles, as proposed in [18]. A bubble is a point associated
with a given layer. Let B be the set of all bubbles in the design. Every atomic block is mapped onto m distinct
bubbles according to a specific mapping Ω → B : B, where m is a finite natural number. For simplicity, but
without loss of generality, suppose that m is constant over Ω. Note that |B| grows linearly with the number of
atomic blocks and pins.
Paths can be represented by a continuous curve of finite length which begins and ends in a bubble. Such
curve is known as rough routing [19]. The design rules of a given technology can be seen as minimum spacing
constraints between the perimeters of bubbles and paths. Alternatively, after proper scaling of the design rules,
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Figure 6: Bubbles and rough routings
one can consider bubbles as points, and paths as curves of zero-thickness. For simplicity we have adopted this
convention. Let topological routing be an equivalence class of rough routings connecting its pins. Two rough
routings of a wire are equivalent when one can be obtained from the other by continuous deformation with no
violations of any of the scaled design rules. Assume that every pair of bubbles is connected by an edge, then if
a topological routing crosses such an edge, it is said to intersect topologically the edge.
If every region in the layout is partitioned in simply connected regions, each containing no bubbles, then
such regions are called simple regions. Figure 6(a) shows an interconnect and some obstacles, while Figure 6(b)
depicts the corresponding partition into simple regions. The rough routing connecting bubble 4 to 0 can be
represented in terms of the sequence of all topological intersections. In this case such a sequence is: σ =
(23,13,37,36,38,58,59,50). Note that symbol Xi Xj represents the topological intersection of the rough routing
with the edge spanned by bubbles Xi and Xj . Define E" as the set of all simple regions in a given layer ' and
a planar subset T" ⊂ E" as one in which distinct edges do not intersect or they intersect at only one of the
vertices. In addition, if T" has a convex boundary or convex hull, it is said to be maximally planar. Under these
conditions, T" is called triangulation [20]. Let us now assume that an arbitrary triangulation T" is in place for
each layer. Let B" be the set of all the bubbles associated with T". For convenience, although not needed, let us
set four bubbles at the extremities of the union of all the layers, so as to encompass every layer.
Sequence σ is a non-unique representation of all the rough routings associated with the class of this topo-
logical routing. Hence, to make such representation resilient to minor modifications, it is necessary to convert it
onto a canonical form. This is done simply removing adjacent identical edges, which form so-called loops. The
unique canonical form of an arbitrary topological routing τ is called topological signature στ . The complexity
of loop removal is higher when it involves a large number of rough routings. The process in this case must be
recursively performed.
Triangulations are not unique. However if the method used to obtain a certain triangulation is an invariant,
then the signature is also invariant for a certain design. Figure 7(a) for example shows a simple layout based
on standard cells organized in two rows with the corresponding interconnect. Figure 7(b) shows a possible
triangulation of the associated topology. The computational scheme and circuit topology determine the final
result [20].
Recall that the uniqueness of a signature is defined by probability Pu, its robustness by Pm. Topological
intersections are unique for a given design and triangulation, while a triangulation is determined by the utilized
algorithm and by set B. For each layer the number of possible triangulations grows factorially as (|B"|−1)!/3!,
hence it is reasonable to choose a layer '∗ which maximizes |B"| over all layers. By a conservative estimate,
NT , the total number of possible triangulations over all layers, is then NT ≥ (|B"∗ | − 1)!/3!. Suppose now
that all N"∗ topological routings in '∗ consist of Ni i-terminal nets, i = 2, . . . ,Nmax. Then, all N"∗ topological
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Figure 7: (a) Layout; (b) Associated triangulation
routings can be represented in terms of N′ two-terminal sub-routings, with N′ = ∑Nmaxi=2 Ni (i − 1). As a
consequence, the number of possible topological signatures can be computed as Nσ ≥ NT ( N
′
2 ), hence the
estimate of Pu becomes Pu ≤ 1Nσ . For example, suppose that for a given design |B"∗ | = 20, N"∗ = 10,
N2 = 3,N3 = 5,N4 = 2. Then, Nσ ≥ (20− 1)!171/3! = 3.5× 1018, hence Pu ≤ 2.9× 10−19.
In the absence of tampering Pm = 0, i.e. the signature extracted from a topology matches 100% with the
one which is registered in the signature bank. If tampering has occurred, it needs to be modeled in order to
properly estimate its effects on Pm. Let us consider the following tampering attempts: (1) routing modification,
(2) atomic block modification, and (3) atomic block move and/or addition/deletion. Attempt (1) does not change
triangulation, however it may cause changes in the signature. Such changes are of three basic types: symbol
addition, deletion and swap. More than one symbol may be involved in the change at any time, however, when
this occurs, the change can be modeled in terms of a composition of simple symbol modifications. Attempts
(2) and (3) may change the triangulation. However, their effects can be modeled in terms of simple symbol
operations.
Define Pr as the probability that a symbol change occurs. Then, the probability that a signature of size t
mutates is Pt =
∑t
j=1(
|B|
j
) [Pr]j × [(1 − Pr)]|B|−j . Hence, for example, if t = 1 and Pr = 10−5, then
Pm ≤ 9× 10−6.
Signature detection consists of the following phases
1. bubble extraction
2. transformation inference
3. bubble matching
4. triangulation
5. signature computation
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Figure 8: Transformation inference: (a) embedded, (b) host design
The initial layout is flattened and all its layers are extracted and deconstructed into polygons or basic standard
cells. Using standard slicing techniques [21], the layout is partitioned in rectilinear areas encompassing exactly
one atomic block. The complexity of this operation is O(|Ω| log|Ω|) where |Ω| is the number of objects in the
layout. Using mapping B, the design is entirely converted into a bubble-based representation in O(|Ω|) time
(phase 1).
In order to detect the presence of blocks with known signatures embedded in the design, one has to infer the
most likely orientation of every candidate block. This operation is performed by matching complex interconnect
patterns present in both the host and the embedded design. Consider the designs of Figure 8. Suppose the inter-
connects shown in shaded lines are to be used to determine the orientation of the embedded circuit within the
host. Let us first catalog all the interconnects present in both layouts in order of size (equal to the number of in-
terconnect segments) in O(n log n) time. Then, for each pair of interconnects of identical size, a transformation
(!x,!y, θ, sx, sy) is derived which maximizes the number of points that can be transformed from the embed-
ded to the host design. Note that sx, sy represent a possible scaling operation. Deriving (!x,!y, θ, sx, sy)
requires the solution of a system of eight linear equations for each pair of candidate interconnects in the worst
case. Then, the most frequently occurring transformation is selected. The solution time of each system of
equations is constant, the worst case time complexity is therefore quadratic in the number of interconnects of
identical size. (phase 2).
Next, the bubble representation of the host needs to be matched with that of the transformed embedded
design. This procedure is accomplished by superimposing the designs and by assigning every bubble in the
host to exactly one in the embedded design which minimizes the Euclidean distance. The search is initially
performed within a zero range, which is augmented multiple times by a unit length until a neighbor is found.
Figure 9 shows the range search process (phase 3).
Finally, using optimal algorithms, a Delauney triangulation is computed in O(|B| log|B|) time for both
designs [20, p. 241] (phase 4). The line segment intersection algorithm is used for the computation of the edges
being intersected by each topological routing. The complexity of this operation is again O(|B| log|B|) [20,
p. 285]. The signature is derived from this information in a straightforward way (phase 5). In summary, the
complexity of entire signature detection process is O(n log n), where n is the number of atomic blocks, pins
and Steiner points in the topology.
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Figure 9: Principle of range search
circuit # states # I/O # I/O chg. nmin orig. FSM Monte Carlo Pu Overhead
area CPU area CPU
s27 6 4/1 1/3 9 632 0s 1.53k 0.1s 1.4× 10−11 143%
bbara 10 4/2 1/1 10 1.16k 0.1s 2.01k 0.1s 9.3× 10−10 73%
dk14 7 3/5 1/0 7 1.48k 0.1s 1.84k 0.1s 2.9× 10−11 24%
styr 30 9/10 1/0 4 8.6k 0.1s 10.69k 0.1s 9.1× 10−13 22%
bbsse 16 7/7 1/0 10 2.28k 0s 2.62k 0.1s 2.9× 10−11 6.3%
cse 16 7/7 1/0 5 3.84k 0.1s 4.08k 0.1s 2.9× 10−11 6%
sse 16 7/7 0/0 3 2.29k 0s 2.43k 0.1s 4.7× 10−7 5.9%
ex1 20 9/19 0/0 4 5.37k 0.1s 5.55k 0.1s 1.3× 10−23 3.2%
ex1 20 9/19 0/0 2 5.37k 0.1s 5.40k 0.1s 3.6× 10−12 0.6%
viterbi 68 15/59 1/0 2 13.49k 1.5s 13.61k 15s 3.0× 10−36 0.8%
dec 56 16/23 1/0 2 14.75k 0.5s 14.78k 5s 1.4× 10−14 0.2%
scf 121 27/56 0/0 2 20.97k 3.4s 21.02k 34s 1.9× 10−34 0.2%
Table 1: IWLS 93 FSM benchmarks. The number of States and the number of I/O pins refer to the original FSM,
while I/O chg. refers to the modified FSM. Overhead is the extra area of the modified FSM
5 Examples
5.1 HDL Level
In our experiments we have used FSMs from the IWLS93 benchmark set. The tools were implemented in
C/C++ and run under UNIX and Linux operating systems. Watermarking was performed on ISFSMs as well as
CSFSMs. Constraint Pu was selected so as to require, in some cases, expansion of Σ and/or !. The increase
in the number of states |Q| and input/output bits |Σ| is expressed by the area estimates. The estimates are based
on technology mapping obtained with SIS[22] using the MSU script. Table 1 lists all relevant experimental data
and specifications on the robustness of the watermark. For the FSM minimization stage in the algorithm the
tools STAMINA and NOVA[14] were used. The area results are based on the actual circuit implementation after
technology mapping obtained via SISand relate to the number of gates.
As expected, larger FSMs require less overhead for comparable robustness. Note, as shown in benchmark
ex1, that overhead can be traded for smaller values of Pu. These overhead results are comparable to the
ones obtained in [11]. The overhead of benchmark s27 was extremely high due to the increase of the output
alphabet. Such expansion was however necessary to boost the watermark’s confidence.
Exhaustive search could be performed only in sse due to the extreme computational complexity of the
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circ. nn/ dev./ ECO density re- CPU
Nn IO/nets 5 % 10 % des. [s]
s27 2/∞ 69/5/96 99.05 96.68 8.24 76.9
s27 3/∞ 100 100 7.80 53.0
s27 10/∞ 100 100 4.28 43.0
s444 2/∞ 709/9/932 100 93.0 10−6 1598
s444 10/∞ 100 93.5 10−6 1087
s832 4/∞ 1686/37/2127 100 - 10−6 1950
s832 10/∞ 100 - 10−6 1620
s1196 10/∞ 2105/28/2682 100 96.0 10−6 2383
Table 2: Signature matching with ECOs and re-design
method. The CPU time in this case was 1.0 second for an area of 2.33k gates. For the other circuits an estimate
of a lowerbound of the time required by the search can be computed. Such time estimates are derived multiply-
ing the time required by one minimization with the minimum number of free configurations, i.e. 2|I(min)u | nmin ,
where |I(min)u | = minq′ ∈ U ′ |I
(q′)
u |.
In the Monte Carlo approach a maximum of ten input sequences sσ was explored. Alternatively one could
select such upperbound based on some estimate or measurement of the standard deviation of the minimized
machine’s size.
5.2 Structural and Physical Implementation Levels
A complete pass in a typical design flow was simulated in order to verify the suitability of the approach. The
tools utilized in the flow were implemented in C/C++ running under UNIX/LINUX operating systems. All
CPU times are referred to a Sun UltraSparc 2 with 256MB of memory. The experiments were based on a set of
MCNC 86 and ISCAS 85/89 benchmarks. Each circuit was synthesized and mapped to a SCMOS technology
using SIS[23]. Place&route was performed by TIMBERWOLFSC-4.1[24].
To simulate the registration phase, a signature was generated for each benchmark. Then, small modifications
were introduced in every benchmark to check whether the signature was resilient to “official” Engineering
Change Orders (ECOs) and scaling. Later, a variable number of random non signature-invariant mappings F
were performed on the benchmark’s layout so as to maximize the potential damage to the circuit. F introduced
changes on atomic blocks, pins, Steiner points, and nets, uniformly distributed over the entire circuit. Three
types of modifications were implemented: (1) translation/rotation, (2) swap, and (3) stretch, aimed at simulating
illegal tampering. The signatures associated to the modified designs were compared with the original ones.
Finally, the benchmarks were entirely redesigned and the signatures were again compared to the original ones,
thus estimating the event that a design could be mistakenly detected even when a “legal” redesign had taken
place.
Table 2 reports circuit data, such as device, IO pin, and net count. The signature matching rates are given for
several modification densities, simulating an ECO applied to the circuit. The signature was constructed with a
minimum net size nn of 2, 3, 4 or 10 terminals, while no net size upperbound Nn was used. As expected, small
ECOs generally resulted in perfect matching, while re-designs resulted in very low matching rates. Moreover,
small circuits were less robust to tampering than large ones, due to the lower number of degrees of freedom
available to their design.
For the detection phase a large benchmark was selected as the host design. Small benchmarks were embed-
ded, at random locations, in the host. The detection algorithm was run on this example to extract the original
signature of the host as well as that of the embedded designs. In various experiments the embedded circuits
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embedded host nn/ ECO density CPU
circ. circ. Nn 0 % 10 % [s]
s27 s1196 1/∞ 73.8 73.8 218
s27 s1196 2/∞ 72.7 72.7 218
s27 s1196 5/∞ 72.7 72.7 218
s1196 - 1/∞ 100.0 99.2 1241
s1196 - 2/∞ 100.0 99.0 1241
s1196 - 5/∞ 100.0 98.6 1241
Table 3: Signature matching with embedded circuits
made up 1% to 10% of the entire host. Finally, tampered circuits were embedded in the host to verify the
robustness of the approach in the presence of multiple levels of tampering. Table 3 summarizes the results of
the detection experiment. Despite the presence of embedded circuits, the host still maintained high signature
matching (rows 3-6 in Table 3). The recognition algorithm performed well in identifying both untampered
embedded circuits and heavily tampered ones.
6 Conclusions
Protecting copyrights of intellectual property providers and integrators has become a serious problem. It arises
from a recent industry shift in which electronic circuits are readily available in a form of virtual blocks at
any abstraction levels, thus allowing for abuses and theft. Several methods have been described to generate
watermarks at various levels of hierarchy during the electronic design flow. Modifications to the flow have
been described to integrated watermarks at all abstraction levels. Ways of effectively detecting the presence of
a watermark have been suggested so as to minimize the disruption of product cycles while allowing forensic
analysis of large numbers of suspected circuits. If supported by an enforcement infrastructure at the place
of fabrication, the described methods are effective in detecting and tracing intellectual property infringement
before fabrication, thus minimizing potential litigation.
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